Back in 2007, TechViewz published a guide about securing wireless networks using PEAP and MSCHAPv2.
At the time, this was proper enterprise WiFi stuff.
Instead of giving everyone the same WiFi password, organisations could use 802.1X, RADIUS and individual usernames and passwords. Someone leaving the company didn't mean changing the WiFi password for the entire office.
Pretty advanced for 2007.
Almost 20 years later, the WiFi is still there.
But the security thinking around it has changed quite a bit.
The original TechViewz PEAP article from 2007 relied on PEAP with MSCHAPv2. It basically protected password based authentication inside an encrypted tunnel.
It worked. It was widely deployed. Plenty of networks still use it today.
But passwords have become the awkward part.
Microsoft now recommends moving away from MSCHAPv2 based WiFi authentication where possible. One modern alternative is EAP TLS, where certificates can be used to authenticate users or devices instead.
That sounds very enterprise and boring, but the idea is actually simple.
A company laptop can basically say:
"I'm a company managed device. Here's my certificate to prove it."
The network checks the certificate before allowing access.
No employee typing the corporate password into a random WiFi prompt. No shared WiFi password being passed around WhatsApp. And stealing someone's password doesn't automatically mean having everything needed to connect.
WiFi security itself has moved forward too.
WPA2 Enterprise became common after that original article was written. Now there's WPA3 Enterprise, including a 192 bit security mode intended for environments requiring stronger cryptographic protection. For that mode, EAP TLS is the supported authentication approach.
But perhaps the biggest difference isn't WPA3 or certificates.
It's how organisations think about identity.
In 2007, successfully authenticating to corporate WiFi could mean getting fairly broad access to the internal network.
In 2026, simply being connected shouldn't automatically mean being trusted.
Who is the user? Is the laptop managed? Is the certificate valid? Is the device compliant? What applications should it actually reach?
WiFi has basically become another entry point into a much larger identity and access decision.
And that's probably the coolest part about looking back at an old technology article.
The original problem hasn't disappeared.
People still walk into an office, open a laptop and expect WiFi to connect.
What happens behind that tiny WiFi icon, though, has changed enormously.
In 2007, the challenge was securing the wireless connection.
In 2026, the challenge is deciding what should be trusted after it connects.